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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND THE KURDS* 
DR. AMIR A. MAJID·· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article analyses the Kurdish rebellion for autonomy, 
the actions of the Iraqi forces against them and the measures 
taken by the United Nations, the United States and other 
Coalition States to protect the Kurds in the aftermath of the 
January/February 1991 Gulf War. The international actions 
will be assessed in light of the present rules of International 
Law and, in particular, whether they contravene any provision 
of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide. 1 
Before the commencement of Operation Desert Storm on 
January 17, 1991, and during this operation, various Ameri-
can, British, French, Kuwaiti, Saudi, Egyptian, Turkish and 
other leaders and politicians, as well as many Western world 
affairs commentators, looked towards the Iraqi people to re-
move Saddam Hussein and establish a fairer government in 
their country. Some of these leaders, mainly from the U.S. and 
* Edited by Daniel Alweiss. 
** Senior Lecturer (International Law), London Guildhall University. The 
author expresses his wann gratitude to Mr. Richard Pitt, the University Law 
Librarian, whose generous research support made possible the completion of this 
article. He is also obliged to the Editors of SOCIALIST LAWYER, London, for allow-
ing him to consolidate here some of the ideas expressed in his article Kurds - No 
Safe Haven in International Law, SOCIALIST LAWYER, 14, 17 (June 1991). 
1. 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951) (hereinafter 1948 Genocide Convention). 
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Israel, directly advocated the forcible overthrow of the Saddam 
Regime. Others outlined the misery of and devastation to Iraq 
brought about by his regime and, believing that it was for 
Iraqis to decide what kind of government they wished to have, 
expressed the hope that the Iraqi population would see its self-
enlightened interest in ousting President Saddam Hussein and 
his confederates.2 
On February 27, U.S. President George Bush announced 
the informal cease fire, effective midnight, Washington time, 
February 28, 1991. As soon as the change-seeking people of 
Iraq realised that Saddam Hussein's regime was definitively 
defeated, they rose up against it. The Shi'ites in the southern 
region of Iraq and the Kurds in northern Iraq had already 
been struggling for reform for several years. BBC World Ser-
vice reported on March 4, 1991, that a major rebellion by the 
Shi'ites was underway and that some units of the Iraqi forces 
had joined the rebels. At the same time, the Kurds started to 
fight for freedom from Iraq, with combat intensifying in subse-
quent days. 
The Shi'ite rebels, in light of their affinity with Iran and 
the Shi'ites in Lebanon, did not attract much sympathy from 
the U.S. or other allies until their plight became extremely 
intolerable in summer/autumn 1992. Some Western leaders 
went out of their way to express their belief in the territorial 
integrity and political independence of Iraq, even though the 
Shi'ites did not threaten these. The real fear appeared to be 
the possibility that if victorious the Shi'ites might or might not 
establish, in Iraq, a fundamentalist regime similar to that in 
Iran. 
Sadly, an opportunity to effectively intervene was missed 
in the first few weeks after the ceasefire. The U.S. and allies 
watched the unequal battles fought by Iraqi Republic Guards 
against Shi'ites in th~ south and Kurds in the north, hoping 
that anti-Saddam forces would win in the end. 
2. Many statesmen, politicians, intellectuals, commentators and journalists 
took this indirect approach of persuasion. For instance, Lord Carrington, a former 
British Foreign Secretary and past Secretary-General of NATO, took this approach 
in an interview with BBC Radio Four, FM News (Feb. 27, 1991). 
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However, as many military analysts observed, Saddam 
Hussein still possessed sufficient superiority over the iU-
equipped and less organised rebelling pockets of population. It 
took more than five weeks for the world to realise that hun-
dreds of thousands of refugees fleeing to Iran and Turkey were 
not likely to return to an Iraq governed by victorious rebels -
instead, Saddam Hussein was intact and the remaining 
Shi'ites and Kurds were in danger of extermination. 
Since the stated objective of the Kurds was to obtain a 
separate homeland (in negotiations scaled-down to regional 
autonomy), the Iraqi soldiers fought against them with more 
ferocity. In consequence, they were forced to flee in very large 
numbers. Iraqi soldiers chased them and thousands of them 
took refuge in the inhospitable peaks of the cold and barren 
mountains on the Iraq-Turkey border. An equal number of 
Kurds, if not more, took refuge in Iran. At the height of this 
unfortunate exodus, approximately three million Iraqi Kurds 
were in Turkey, Iran, and trapped in the Iraqi-Turkish moun-
tains. 
The Kurds did not suffer the same disadvantages as the 
Shi'ites in attracting the sympathies of the Western statesmen 
and citizens. In the middle of April, 1991, appalling television 
pictures and media reports about the plight of Kurds reached 
the West. On April 26, 1991, BBC World Service quoted an 
U.N. senior officer in the area as reporting that up to 2000 
Kurds were dying every day due to worsening conditions, 
shortage of essential supplies, and lack of adequate shelter. 
Opposition politicians, commentators and members of the pub-
lic roundly criticised governments for being the silent specta-
tors· of the brutal treatment meted out by the Saddam regime 
to the Kurdish minority. By then the Western States had lost 
the opportunity of seeing the removal of Saddam Hussein by 
the Iraqi people; by then non-intervention in the domestic 
affairs of Iraq had been indelibly engraved on countless public 
tablets. 
To neutralise the public outrage, the Western Coalition 
States turned to other options. One uncontroversial option was 
humanitarian assistance. This was provided with reasonable 
promptitude and efficiency. The U.N. bodies were galvanised 
3
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into action, most significantly the office of the U.N. Commis-
sioner for Refugees. While this speed of action can favourably 
be compared to the quick response to other similar calamities, 
it did not rank as high as fighting wars. For example, in the 
beginning of April, 1991, the U.N. Secretary General appealed 
for £580 million for the Kurdish relief but despite the urgency 
the U.N. only funded £100 million after 4 weeks.3 
The question arises: What could the world do legally? This 
is a formidable question. The nations have been so far too 
much concerned with their political, military, economic and 
other nationalistic interests. Thus, again, as on an intolerably 
high number of occasions, the welfare of the individual, "the 
ultimate unit of all law"\ has been pushed down on the agen-
da of formulation of new rules of International Law. 
There is a burgeoning branch of International Law dealing 
with the declaration, preservation and protection of human 
rights. In the limited ambit of this article, the applicability of 
the present International Law to the Kurdish exodus and re-
lated issues can be assessed from three angles: 1. the 1948 
Genocide Convention, 2. the Right of Self-Determination and 3. 
Human Rights in General. Before these can be addressed, how-
ever, the underlying issue of intervention in the domestic af-
fairs of Iraq must be analysed. 
II. INTERVENTION IN STATE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 
Whatever may be the legal analysis of the situation, one 
has to face the argument on behalf of Iraq that International 
Law forbids any State to intervene in the domestic affairs of 
another State. This is undoubtedly the case. The classical in-
3. The BBC U.N. Correspondent, in his report from New York, reported the 
frustration expressed by some U.N. officials and said that member States could 
not ask the Organisation to do certain things without providing it with the neces-
sary resources. See "News Hour", BBC World Service, 1300 GMT (Apr. 27, 1991). 
4. An expression widely used by one-time judge of the International Court of 
Justice, Hersch Lauterpacht; see, e.g., I INTERNATIONAL LAw - BEING THE COLLECT-
ED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 303 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1970). 
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ternational jurists were unwilling to make any concession to 
the inviolability of the municipal domain of a State.5 In conse-
quence of awful abuses of human rights in the first 45 years of 
this century, particularly in the nazi era, many jurists believed 
and many States accepted that the human beings were the 
ultimate subjects of International Law and gross violation of 
these rights - including the right to life, liberty, culture, reli-
gion and self-determination - was a legitimate and active con-
cern of International Law. This, however, has not gained uni-
versal acceptance. As recently as April, 1991, Chinese Prime 
Minister Li Peng denied the presence of any objective human 
rights under International Law and said that China would 
only be bound to subject its human rights record to the scruti-
ny of International Law to the extent it has obliged itself by 
treaty obligations. He deemed it as an "interfer~nce with the 
sovereignty of China" if the U.S. or any other State took any 
action linked to the Chinese human rights record. 
As far as the legitimating role of International Law, the 
treaties and the U.N. resolutions pertaining to the protection 
of human rights are functioning well. The civilised States ad-
here to them and support any verbal condemnation by institu-
tional resolutions. In the context of the controlling role of In-
ternational Law, these States are reluctant to give full teeth to 
International Law of Human Rights. On some occasions, how-
ever, such as the UDI6 in Rhodesia and apartheid in South 
Mrica, the usurpation of the majority rights has been punished 
by economic sanctions. 
Almost every State and many modem international jurists 
are unwilling to go further than the penalty of economic sanc-
tions. The reason behind this reluctance is too complex to be 
thoroughly discussed in this article. A key view though, in the 
eyes of the reconstructors of the post World War II regime and 
the framers of the U.N. Charter, was that the supreme evil 
was the "scourge of war". Hence, Article 2, para. 4 of the U.N. 
5. This is abundantly clear from the writings of renowned international law-
yers like Hyde, Moore, Hudson, Hackworth, Jessup, Oppenheim, Calvo and Tunkin. 
Briggs, for instance, perceived the situation not very differently soon after World 
War II. See THE LAw OF NATIONS 508-513 (Herbert W. Briggs ed., 2d ed. 1952). 
6. Unilateral Declaration of Independence [of Southern Rhodesia]. 
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Charter obliged the member States "to refrain ... from the use 
or threat of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence" of any member State. The object was to impose 
a complete ban on war, other than in self-defence (Art. 51). To 
ensure this complete embargo on war, the preexisting corner-
stone principle of International Law of "exclusive domestic 
jurisdiction" was applied even to the U.N .. Accordingly, Article 
2, para. 7 forbids the U.N. from intervening in matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state".7 
Thus, the U.N. military enforcement is indubitably reserved 
for ending a breach of peace, threat to peace or an act of ag-
gression. 
Some international lawyers narrowly interpret this prohi-
bition and argue that human rights, inter alia, are not "essen-
tially" within the domestic jurisdiction of a State; rather, they 
are matters with which mankind as a whole is concerned. 
Nevertheless, the concept of non-intervention remains a power-
ful obstruction to the enforcement of human rights. 
, 
III. BASES FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF 
THE KURDS 
A. 1948 GENOCIDE CONVENTION 
In consequence of persuasive writings about Hitlerism and 
fascism, and the exposure of heinous war crimes of some indi-
viduals in the Nuremberg and other trials, the States were 
enthusiastic and committed to prevent any recurrence of geno-
cidal oppression by any future dictator. The Genocide Conven-
tion, after its draft was circulated for consultation and remarks 
considered, was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 
December 9, 1948, in Paris.s Iraq, being a Contracting Party 
to the Convention, has undertaken "to prevent and punish" 
genocide which is a crime under international law "whether 
committed in time of peace or time of war" (Art. I). 
7. For analysis of this prohibition, see: D. P. O'CONNELL, I INTERNATIONAL 
LAw 308-313 (1970). 
8. GA Res. 260A, U.N. Doc. N810, at 174 (1948). On April 29, 1991, the 
Convention was ratified by 106 States. For a thorough resume of this instrument, 
see Matthew Lippman, The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 3 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1-65 (1985). 
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Thus, if genocide is proven, Iraq and other parties to the 
Convention have an obligation to enforce the Convention. What 
took place in relation to Kurds, in light of the present law, 
however, cannot be prosecuted as the crime of "genocide". The 
most appropriate provision under which genocide by the 
Saddam regime may be established is Article II(c). It provides 
that a State commits a crime of genocide when, "with intent to 
destroy" it inflicts, upon "a national, ethnical, racial or reli-
gious group" such "conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part". 
If the Kurds do not qualify as a "national" group since 
they are scattered in substantial numbers in Iraq, Iran, and 
Turkey, with some of their brethren living in Armenia and 
Syria, there is still no difficulty in categorising them as an 
"ethnical" or "racial" group. The difficulty lies in proving the 
"intent" to destroy the group as such and the commensurate 
actus reus. The U.S., which hesitated to ratify this Convention 
until 1988, has insisted that this intent, as opposed to "basic" 
or "generalised", must be a "specific intent".9 Furthermore, the 
domestic courts of the parties to the Convention, as they 
should be so authorised in compliance with Article V of the 
Convention, can convict a member of the Saddam forces. The 
alternative is to establish an ad hoc International Penal Court 
envisaged by Article VI of the Genocide Convention. Many dif-
ficulties surround the use of this option. These range from 
ascertaining proper venue and finding acceptable judges to 
overcoming the hesistancy of nations, like the U.S., which have 
historically not supported the concept of an international court 
assuming any criminal jurisdiction. In any event, such a tribu-
nal was not established to examine the human right crimes 
against the Kurds in Iraq. In addition, in cases of either do-
mestic or international adjudication, gathering reliable and 
cogent evidence from a territory under the occupation of an 
alleged perpetrator of the offence and from people on both 
sides of the hatred line makes the whole exercise academic. 
9. See Lawrence J. Leblanc, The Intent to Destroy Groups in the Genocide 
Convention: The Proposed U.S. Understanding, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 369-385 (1984). 
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B. SELF-DETERMINATION 
The case for Self-Determination for Kurds is very weak. 
According to several authors and the International Court of 
Justice1o, the U.N. General Assembly resolution 1514 of De-
cember 14, 1960 (passed by 89 States in favour, 9 abstentions 
and none against) represents modern Customary International 
Law. The resolution robustly enunciates the right of Self-De-
termination for peoples who are ethnically separate and occupy 
a geographically distinct territory. The Kurds may be able to 
prove that they are ethnically separate from the Arabs but 
they cannot show that they occupy a "distinct" territory. They 
are present in five different countries. Hence, they have virtu-
ally no chance of constructing a legal claim to Self-Determina-
tion. Even if they wish to achieve a political settlement, their 
position is hopelessly weakened by the fact that one of the 
States (Turkey) in which they live has great influence in con-
temporary times as a member of NATO.ll Any grant of inde-
pendent homeland to the Kurds will be blocked by Turkey or 
its allies as a dangerous precedent. Resistance to such an idea 
will also come from other States like India where several size-
able minorities are demanding Self-Determination. 
C. HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL 
Thus, neither the Genocide Convention nor the Right to 
Self- Determination could have produced resolution of the 
Kurdish problems. This indeed is shameful. 
There is, however, another possible basis for protective 
action. Over the years States have used the established princi-
ples of International Law of Human Rights to justify their 
actions. Examples of Rhodesia and South Africa have already 
10. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Afri· 
ca in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 
1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-35. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATION-
AL LAw 595-598 (4th ed. 1990). 
11. See Robert McCorquodale, The World has a legal duty to protect Kurds, 
INDEPENDENT, April 20, 1991 in which Prof. McCorquodale recognises these weak-
ening aspects of the Kurdish case. 
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been mentioned. Embargo on loans, transfer of technology, or 
sale of weapons; withdrawal of "Most Favoured Nation" trad-
ing status; or breach or suspension of diplomatic relations have 
been used to control a violator of human rights. In the Kurdish 
case these measures were already in operation. The only option 
to stop the violation by the Saddam regime of the internation-
ally recognised, basic rights of the Kurds to life, liberty, home, 
family, and culture was to intervene in the situation by the use 
or threat of force. 
Can this be done under International Law? The answer is 
"yes". The "humanitarian intervention under International 
Law" - as it is known to Hersch Lauterpacht and other inter-
national lawyers - even though more easily justified when 
foreign citizens are being maltreated, can equally be undertak-
en "for the purpose of preventing a State from treating its own 
nationals in a cruel and barbarous fashion."12 Sir Hartley 
Shawcross, representing the United Kingdom at the U.N., saw 
no legal impediment in undertaking an armed humanitarian 
intervention to prevent gross abuses of human rights. He said 
that where genocide was involved: "[H]umanitarian interven-
tion by international law was even more definitely warranted. 
Dictators should be warned that if they infringed upon human 
rights, they acted on their own risk and that international law 
would condemn them".13 International Law acknowledges the 
primacy of domestic sovereigns but if they abuse it and take 
themselves over the limits of law, they forfeit this right of 
autonomy and become accountable to the authority of Interna-
tional Law. 
It is a damning indictment of the community of States 
that they have not produced an effective machinery to deal 
with the illegalities of this serious kind. It appears that the 
U.S., in common with other major States, has been less than 
enthusiastic to establish a sound system of objective and disin-
terested machinery of verifying and punishing the human 
12. See I INTERNATIONAL LAw - BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH 
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 7. For a recent p~gressive approach, see W. Michael 
Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 
AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 876 (1990). 
13. U.N. GOAR 6th Comm., 1st Sess., 22nd mtg. at 101-2, U.N. Doc. AlC.6/84 
(1946); See also Lippman, supra note 8, at 6. 
9
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rights delicts. 14 It would seem that one explanation for this 
stand is that those nations, such as the U.S. with superior 
power and wealth, wish to retain maximum control of the 
situation by dictating terms and gathering support to achieve a 
particular result. 
In this perspective, regarding the plight of the Kurds, the 
Security Council could only pass resolution S/688 on April 5, 
1991 - five weeks after the Kurdish uprising. Even though it 
was one of the most advanced manifestations of U.N. action in 
this field, the resolution still remains very weak. It represent-
ed a compromise amongst the U.N. members who genuinely 
wished to do something for the Kurds - such as the U.K, albeit 
in response to public pressure - and those who wished to avoid 
establishing a precedent with which they could not live in the 
future. 
In resolution 688, the Security Council, "[m]indful of its 
duties and its responsibilities under the Charter of the United 
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and securi-
ty" and "[r]ecalling Article 2, para. 7 of the Charter of the 
United Nations", stated that it was "[g]ravely concerned by the 
repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of 
Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas 
which led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across 
international frontiers". It further stated that it was "[d]eeply 
disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved". 
To satisfy the supporters of Article 2, para. 7, the Security 
Council in this resolution referred to letters of Turkey, France, 
and Iran, thus thickening the international flavour of the is-
sue. It mentioned that the repression lead to "cross border 
incursions" which it deemed to "threaten international peace 
and security in the region". The resolution condemned "the 
repression of the Iraqi civilian population", demanded the 
immediate end of this repression and insisted on immediate 
access of international humanitarian assistance organisations 
14. The U.S. signed the Genocide Convention just two days after its adoption 
on December 9, 1948, but didn't ratify it until November 25, 1988, even then with 
two reservations and five "understandings". For the reasons for this long delay by 
the U.S., see Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Re-
lating to International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 612, 622 (1986); Id. 79 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 116, 131 (1985); and LeBlanc, supra note 11. 
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to all those in need. Paragraphs 4-5 authorised the Secretary 
General to provide humanitarian assistance and report back to 
the Council. 
This resolution would certainly have had a positive effect 
on a civilised regime but the Saddam regime carried on its 
brutal deeds - to some extent fueled by the military activities 
of the Kurdish rebels. When public outrage intensified, the 
British Prime Minister, Mr. John Major, put forward a plan of 
"safe haven for the Kurds". The plan envisaged that some 
territory in northern Iraq could be identified as a haven in 
which Kurds could live unmolested by Iraqi soldiers. With the 
support of the U.S. and other allies, the Iraqis were forced to 
allow the units of the Coalition forces to establish a "safe zone" 
to which the Kurdish refugees were encouraged to return. 
Later the zone was further extended. The safe haven did in-
duce many of the displaced Kurds to return to their homes 
and, as of May 27, 1991, only about 200,000 Kurds were still 
in Iran, Turkey and in mountains on the Iraqi-Turkish border. 
On April 28, 1991, in a meeting with the British Foreign 
Secretary, Mr. Douglas Hurd, other Foreign Ministers of the 
EEC (the "European Union" since November 1, 1993) pledged 
their support for the maintenance of the safety zone. Britain 
and its friends at the U.N. sought a resolution by the Security 
Council to give international legitimacy to the "safe haven" 
concept, but they met stern resistance. The U.N. legal advisers 
rejected it as being "ultra vires" the provisions of the Charter 
and in particular in contravention of Article 2, para. 7. This 
view was widely shared. For instance, Sir Anthony Parsons, a 
former U.K Permanent Representative to the U.N., doubted 
the legal basis of it and said that the Security Council had 
already gone far enough under the Charter in passing reso-
lution 688. However, this pragmatic concept is presently prov-
ing to be a great reliever of sufferings in Bosnia. It now ap-
pears to have gained legitimacy in the United Nations because 
it is the only effective mechanism available in contemporary 
International Law to prevent gross violations of human 
rights. 15 
15. In the Security Council Resolution 91811994, dated May 17, 1994, (to be 
reprinted in U.N. Doc. S/ResJ918 (1994», the concept of "safe haven" has been 
11
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In the Iraqi context, when the international community 
was not willing to legitimate the idea of "safe haven", the allies 
had no choice but to talk to the Iraqis. Of course, the militarily 
defeated Iraqis were cooperative after negotiating and receiv-
ing strong diplomatic representations including, no doubt, 
warnings of possible real consequences of non-compliance with 
the wishes of the allies. Accordingly, with the Iraqi "consent" 
(in the barest sense of that term) the "Allied Kurdistan Opera-
tion" had to carry on under the U.S. military command to cre-
ate suitable conditions for the Kurds. After having established 
themselves in the border town of Zakho, as a result of an 
agreement with Iraql6, the allied units entered on May 24, 
1991, the Iraqi city of Dohuk which is farther south and the 
seat of a governette. One salient clause of this agreement was 
the search for weapons of the Kurds returning to Dohuk at 
certain check points manned by the Kurdish members of the 
Iraqi police. The U.N. was also operating on the basis of Iraqi 
consent and its negotiations produced an agreement with Iraq 
which allowed it to send about 500 lightly armed guards select-
ed from personnel generally guarding the U.N. offices allover 
the world. 17 It was hoped that the security provided by the 
allied and U.N. forces would send a signal of confidence about 
the safety of the zone and the remaining 200,000 Kurds would 
be persuaded to return from Iran, Turkey and the mountains 
on the Iraqi-Turkish border. IS 
The above discussion discloses that the principle of non-
intervention in domestic jurisdiction triumphed over the coer-
accepted as a viable solution. The U.N. Secretary General advised the Security 
Council: "[I]t is very urgent that, as called for in resolution 918(1994) secured 
humanitarian areas be established [in Rwanda] where the estimated 2 million of 
these unfortunate displaced persons can be provided with both security and assis-
tance." U.N.S.C. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda, 
8/19941640 (May 31, 1994) (required by paragraphs 7 and 20 of S.C. Res. 91811994 
to be submitted to the Security Council). 
16. See THE TELEGRAPH, May 23, 1991, at 8. 
17. See "News Desk" BBC World Service, midnight GMT (May 24, 1991). 
18. The residual pockets of the Kurdish refugees were given sufficient sense of 
security to return and by the end of August, 1991, virtually all of them returned 
to their ancestral homes. However, when the Saddam forces realised that the 
world had again pushed the Kurdish problem down the agenda, they launched a 
military attack and, according to the BBC World Service, in November, 1991, 
about 200,000 Kurds were coerced to flee to safe areas - the issue still appears to 
be as complex as ever. 
12
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cive enforcement against the gross violations of human rights 
by a government of its own citizenry. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this author would like to repeat the age-old 
plea19 for the priority consideration of establishment of impar-
tial organs to monitor and adjudicate the increasing and wors-
ening violations of human rights.20 This will minimise the 
chances of abusive auto-interpretation of situations by power-
ful States which could find excuses to intervene by force in the 
domestic jurisdiction of a country based on selfish and ulterior 
motives. Until this is done, the majority of States will remain 
apprehensive about subscribing to an effective machinery. In 
this regard, the United States can playa significant role be-
cause it enjoys at this time the title of the only real superpow-
er in the world. A glimpse of its policing capability was the 
attack on the malevolent Bosnian Serb units on August 5, 
1994, which could have not been contemplated without U.S. 
support. The attack forced the Serbs to promptly promise to 
return one tank, two armed personnel carriers and some other 
ammunition, which they had brazenly removed from the U.N. 
compound in Sarajevo a few days earlier.21 
19. Jurists like Prof. Brierly were advocating, though with some peSSlmlsm, 
international mechanisms to enforce human rights in the early life of the U.N .. 
See II INTERNATIONAL LAw - BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH 
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 4, at 448. 
20. Paragraph 5 of the U.N. Secretary-General's Report (see supra note 14), 
entitled "The Massacres in Rwanda", records an appalling story of atrocities. Ac-
cording to the Report, between 250,000 to 500,000 children, women and men out 
of the 7 million Rwandan national population were killed in the previous 7 weeks. 
[d .. In hypothetical, proportional terms this would be approximately the equivalent 
to 9-18 million in the U.S .. [d. In light of this level of violence, the Secretary-
General in this Report states: "On the basis of the evidence that has emerged, 
there can be little doubt that it constitutes genocide, since there have been large 
scale killings of communities and families belonging to a particular ethnic group." 
[d .. at para. 36. For further details of the unprecedented violations of human 
rights in Rwanda, see also: Report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights on his Mission to Rwanda, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 
3rd Special Sess., U.N. Doc. ElCN.4IS-313 (May 24-25, 1994) (hereinafter U.N. 
Report on Rwanda). 
21. In the aftermath of a totally inexcusable carnage of civilians in a busy 
market square of Sarajevo on February 5, 1994, the U.N. Secretary-General by his 
letter of February 6, 1994, informed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) that the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) had established that at least 
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By a dedicated effort aimed at boosting confidence in its 
sincerity, backed by consonant deeds, the U.S. can convert the 
global "tenuous consensus,,22 at the U.N. into a cohesive world 
order that can effectively safeguard not only international 
peace but also basic human rights. That it has to be done with-
out wasting any time is amply clear from the U.N. Secretary-
General's lament about the outrageous human conditions in 
Rwanda in 1994 stemming from civil war. He wrote: 
The delay in reaction by the international com-
munity to the genocide in Rwanda has demon-
strated graphically its extreme inadequacy to 
respond urgently with prompt and decisive ac-
tion to humanitarian crises, entwined with 
armed conflict .... We all must recognise that in 
this respect we have failed in our response to 
the agony of Rwanda and, thus, have acquiesced 
in the continued loss of human lives. Our readi-
ness and capacity for action has been demon-
strated to be inadequate at best and deplorable 
at worst, owing to the absence of the collective 
political will. The entire system requires review 
to strengthen its reactive capacity.23 
one of the mortar attacks on the shoppers in the market square on February 5, 
1994, was the work of the Bosnian Serb forces. [Letter from the U.N. Secretary-
General, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, (Feb. 6, 1994)]. "This made it 
necessary to prepare urgently for the use of air attacks to deter further attacks of 
this kind", wrote the U.N. Secretary General. Id .. Acting on the request of the 
U.N. Secretary-General, the NATO Council in a meeting in Brussels on February 
9, 1994, gave authorisation to launch air strikes, at the request of the U.N., 
against artillery or mortar positions on or around Sarajevo which were determined 
by the UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilian targets in that 
city. U.N. News Summary, NSl4I1994, (Feb. 10, 1994). 
22. See D. W. Greig, "Self Defence And The Security Council: What Does Arti-
cle 51 Require?", 40 1NT'L & COMPo L.Q. 366, 390 (1991). 
23. See U.N. Report on Rwanda, supra note 32, at pars. 43. 
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